Pakistan is one of the world’s most consequential and least fully trusted states.
Home to more than 250 million people, it is the fifth most populous country on Earth, the only Muslim-majority nation with a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, and a country situated at the crossroads of South Asia, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. It borders Iran, Afghanistan, China and India. Few countries combine such internal fragility with such strategic significance.
That combination explains why Pakistan repeatedly finds itself at the center of global crises.
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has pursued a strategy rooted in insecurity. Its military and intelligence services have viewed the world through a single overriding lens: survival in the face of a much larger India. That fixation has driven Pakistan to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan, cultivate ties with Islamist movements, build nuclear weapons and maintain relationships with multiple competing powers simultaneously.
The result is a state often described as an ally but rarely regarded as dependable.
During the Cold War, Pakistan aligned with the United States. After Sept. 11, it became a major non-NATO ally and received billions in American aid. Yet Osama bin Laden was found living for years in Abbottabad, not far from Pakistan’s premier military academy. That discovery crystallized Washington’s enduring concern: Pakistan frequently cooperates with the United States while preserving options that cut sharply against American interests.
Today, Islamabad is attempting to reposition itself as a regional mediator and what some analysts call a “responsible middle power.” It maintains close ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, an “all-weather” partnership with China, working relations with Iran and a renewed effort to build influence in Washington. By offering itself as an intermediary in the U.S.-Iran dispute, Pakistan is signaling that it wants to be seen not as a problem to be managed, but as a power whose cooperation is indispensable.
Its nuclear arsenal gives that aspiration credibility. Nuclear weapons do not confer wisdom or reliability, but they ensure Pakistan cannot be marginalized. Pakistan benefits from the geopolitical “nuclear aura” that compels others to take it seriously.
Pakistan’s posture toward Israel remains formally hostile. It does not recognize Israel and domestic politics strongly favor the Palestinian cause. Yet its strategic concerns increasingly center on Iran, extremism and economic survival. Quiet contacts with Israel suggest that public rhetoric may be more rigid than underlying policy.
What should the United States and Israel make of this?
Pakistan is neither a reliable friend nor an inevitable foe. It is a transactional state with genuine leverage, considerable vulnerabilities and a sophisticated ability to play multiple sides at once. That makes engagement necessary but trust conditional.
If Pakistan can help reduce tensions with Iran, its assistance may prove useful. But mediation is not neutrality, and usefulness is not alignment. Reports that Pakistan may have sheltered Iranian military aircraft, if confirmed, would underscore why skepticism remains warranted.
Pakistan wants recognition as a consequential global actor and a responsible middle power. It deserves to be taken seriously. It does not deserve to be taken at its word alone.