For years, Western democracies have treated antisemitism primarily as a law-enforcement problem. When a synagogue is vandalized, a Jewish student assaulted or a hate crime committed, police investigate, prosecutors file charges and institutions issue statements. Then the cycle repeats.

France has finally asked a more uncomfortable question.

A recent French government report examines the role of the Muslim Brotherhood and what it calls “entryism” — the gradual expansion of ideological influence through schools, charities, religious organizations and civic institutions. The report does not accuse ordinary Muslims or criminalize Islam. Instead, it asks whether democratic institutions have become vulnerable to organizations whose long-term objective extends beyond religious practice to the political transformation of society.

That question deserves attention well beyond France. The issue is not simply the Muslim Brotherhood. It is whether democracies can recognize organized ideological movements before they manifest themselves as violence, intimidation or systematic discrimination.

Ironically, France and the United States now represent opposite halves of the same challenge. The United States has become increasingly aggressive in enforcing laws against antisemitic discrimination. Universities have faced federal investigations, lawsuits and funding consequences. Hate crimes are prosecuted. Institutions are being reminded that protecting Jewish students is not optional.

That enforcement is appropriate and overdue. Yet America often treats antisemitism as though it simply appears. We punish discriminatory conduct without fully examining the movements, ideologies and organizations that normalize, encourage or justify it.

France, meanwhile, has become more willing to identify one important ideological source of the problem. But recognizing an ideological network is not the same as dismantling it. Publishing reports is easier than developing lawful, effective policies that protect democratic institutions without compromising democratic freedoms.

America is treating the symptoms. France is only beginning to diagnose the disease.

Oct. 7 should have taught the West something profound. The massacre did not create antisemitism; it exposed how deeply antisemitic narratives had already penetrated parts of academia, activist organizations and social media. Within hours — before Israel had mounted a military response — voices around the world were rationalizing, excusing or even celebrating the slaughter. That infrastructure of ideas did not emerge overnight. It had been nurtured by years of propaganda, institutional legitimacy and the gradual normalization of antisemitic narratives disguised as political discourse.

Democratic governments should stop treating antisemitism solely as a law enforcement problem. They should also recognize it as an organized influence problem. That means continuing to enforce civil rights laws while demanding transparency for foreign funding of universities and nonprofit organizations, enforcing existing disclosure requirements and investigating coordinated foreign influence campaigns. It also means distinguishing carefully between protected religious beliefs and organized political movements that foster unlawful discrimination or seek to undermine democratic institutions.

None of those steps requires abandoning democratic values. They require only the willingness to acknowledge that hatred rarely develops on its own. It grows where ideologies are tolerated, institutions look away and democratic societies confuse vigilance with intolerance.

Hatred does not organize itself. It is taught, financed and institutionalized. Democracies have spent decades learning how to stop terrorists before they strike. They must become equally serious about confronting the ideological ecosystems that make antisemitism respectable long before the next synagogue is vandalized, the next Jewish student is intimidated, or the next victim is buried.