By Stanley Orman
Civilized societies around the world have been celebrating Israel’s success in combating the missile attack from Iran that recently occurred just before the start of the celebration of the Jewish new year. Close to 200 Iranian ballistic missiles were either intercepted or allowed to fall harmlessly in open ground, thanks to a complex interception system operated by the Israel Defense Forces and supported by American naval assets.
Commentators have waxed lyrically on the successes of the joint operation. While joining them, my mind reverted to a time over forty years ago when in March 1983, President Ronald Reagan made his famous introduction of SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative).
Most readers will not recall the worldwide opposition that the speech produced. Allies and opponents of the United States were suddenly united in their opposition to this new concept. Much opposition seemed emotional rather than well-considered, reflecting the way that world leaders had come to accept the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, as an established means of avoiding nuclear war. Most world leaders, having come to power while nuclear deterrence operated under the concept of MAD, were reluctant to even consider a different concept that had not been fully discussed or evaluated. The general consensus was that intercepting incoming ballistic missiles might not even be achievable.
I was a minister in the British Embassy in Washington responsible for all British/American defense interactions when Reagan made his “Star Wars” speech and was surprised at the level of criticism he received, even from British ministers. The only one with an open mind was Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
When I returned to Britain the next year as deputy director of our Nuclear Weapons Establishment, I was tasked with chairing a Ministry of Defense review of the SDI concept.
Our conclusion was that it would take years of effort, but emerging technologies should enable missiles to intercept incoming warheads, and that Britain, because of its independent nuclear deterrent system, should participate in the program. The prime minister agreed, overcame Cabinet member objections and signed a memorandum of understanding to support the American effort. As the newly created director general for SDI Participation, I headed that organization for four years.
Because of the strong support of the president, the program for intercepting ballistic missiles had been given a strong start. Despite efforts within and beyond America to stop it, the program continued, although successive American administrations limited the full development of the original concept.
In the initial stages of development, efforts were made to use lasers and particle beams as speed-of-light interceptors, but that technology proved to be too advanced. However, an almost equally advanced technology of hit-to-kill using the kinetic energy of agile missiles was proven feasible by the United States. Incorporating such a technology into defensive missiles would allow incoming warheads to be destroyed without using any explosives in the defensive systems. Before Reagan died, he was able to learn that SDI, even in the early development stage, had helped lead to the fall of the Soviet Union.
Even after the elapse of forty years, America still has a more limited and less effective defense against ballistic missiles than that envisaged by Reagan. He called for the ability to intercept missiles of all ranges from wherever they are launched, an objective that could be achieved with a more complex architecture combining space, naval and ground-based interceptors. Successive administrations have restricted development to naval and ground-based systems. A space-based component would be essential to provide launch and ascent phase interception of hostile missiles.
Israel, on the other hand, recognizing from the outset because of the 1980 ballistic missile war between Iran and Iraq that it faced an existential threat, pursued its own independent research into missile defense. With far more limited resources, Israel developed a complex integrated architecture to enable midcourse, terminal and short-range interceptors to work cooperatively to track and intercept incoming threats. Using a combination of Arrow, Iron Dome and David’s Sling, its system is able to determine whether the attacking missiles present a real threat and need to be intercepted or can be allowed to land harmlessly.
As demonstrated recently, the Israeli systems can operate cooperatively with the American capabilities. In the recent Iranian attack, U.S. naval assets equipped with midcourse interceptors and stationed between Iran and Israel thinned out attacking missiles, leaving Israel to deal with the rest. It was a fine example of real international cooperation that would have made Reagan proud.
It is timely to reflect that the criticism that met the original introduction of SDI has now led to a position that active missile defense does have an effective role to play in national security. It clearly can add to national security in combination with a sizeable offensive force, cooperatively contributing to an effective deterrent to hostile nations and even terrorist groups.
Thank you, President Reagan.
Dr. Stanley Orman worked for the British Ministry of Defense for thirty years, retiring as an undersecretary of state. He spent time as a minister in the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., deputy director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment and director general of British support to the U.S. SDI program.
.){kind=link}